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Abstract
This article anchors the phenomenon of bureaucratized cybersurveillance
around the concept of the National Surveillance State, a theory attributed to
Professor Jack Balkin of Yale Law School and Professor Sanford Levinson
of the University of Texas School of Law. Pursuant to the theory of the Na-
tional Surveillance State, because of the routinized and administrative na-
ture of government-led surveillance, normalized mass surveillance is viewed
as justified under crime and counterterrorism policy rationales. This arti-
cle contends that the Cybersurveillance State is the successor to the Na-
tional Surveillance State. The Cybersurveillance State harnesses technolo-
gies that fuse biometric and biographic data for risk assessment, embedding
bureaucratized biometric cybersurveillance within the Administrative State.
In ways that are largely invisible, the Cybersurveillance State constructs
digital avatars for administrative governance objectives and targets digital
data deemed suspicious. Consequently, constitutional violations stemming
from cybersurveillance systems will be increasingly difficult to identify and
challenge.
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INTRODUCTION
This article addresses new developments in what has been termed the modern National Surveil-
lance State (Balkin 2008, Balkin & Levinson 2006). The theory of the National Surveillance State
situates the rise of the Cybersurveillance State within the Administrative State. This article argues
that the political and technological structure that supports the emerging Cybersurveillance State
is best examined through a theorization of the National Surveillance State. The political theory of
the National Surveillance State is attributed to Professor Jack Balkin, Knight Professor of Consti-
tutional Law and the First Amendment at Yale Law School, and Professor Sanford Levinson, W.
St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas
School of Law. In the National Surveillance State, the governing emphases are on the following
objectives: (a) a paradigm of preemptive action and preventive policing; (b) radically transparent
identities often based on biometric data, purportedly to achieve better governing outcomes; and
(c) technocratic policymaking and big data–driven decisionmaking that unfold in highly bureau-
cratized settings (Balkin 2008, Balkin & Levinson 2006). The infrastructure required to support
these objectives is now often referred to as cybersurveillance architecture, a description that experts
increasingly use for data surveillance (dataveillance), big data surveillance, and cybersurveillance
(Granick 2017, Greenwald 2014a, Hu 2015b, Rosen 2005, Schneier 2015).
The exponential growth of cybersurveillance architecture and biometric identification sys-
tems is guided and mutually reinforced by these objectives. The coordinated rise of biometric
surveillance and cybersurveillance governance systems is not coincidental but rather is due to
the symbiotic relationship between the two (e.g., biometric cybersurveillance). In other words,
technological developments have incentivized the biometric surveillance apparatus necessary to
carry out precrime-governing rationales, identity management programs, and big data governance
and decisionmaking systems—and vice versa (Balkin 2008, Balkin & Levinson 2006, Lyon 2009).
At least on a theoretical level, the combination of big data surveillance methods and biometric
surveillance systems allows for the analysis of nearly all computer-generated human information
(Ingram 2013, boyd & Crawford 2012). These combined systems permit the collection, storage,
and analysis of all digital footprints and data breadcrumbs. The consequence of this is that all
individuals subject to such surveillance can be both biometrically and biographically tracked and
assessed for risk.
Specifically, modern governance systems increasingly depend upon biometric identification
technologies—e.g., scanned fingerprints and irises, digitized photos for facial recognition tech-
nology, and DNA—to anchor a person’s physical identity to other biographical and behavioral
data (Lyon 2009). Once a biometric identification anchor is established in a database, it can be
used for other data-tracking activities, including data mining, database screening, digital watch-
listing (Kahn 2013, Kalhan 2014, Scahill & Devereaux 2014, Shane 2007, Spiro 2014, Steinbock
2006), and automated “situational awareness” programs (Ramos 2014). In the years following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, policymakers have pursued a preemptive approach to
counterterrorism, and biometric identification and analysis systems play a part in that approach
(Gates 2011, Hu 2013, Magnet 2011, O’Harrow 2005). Policymakers view these technological
developments, including biometric technologies, as tools with the potential to identify individuals
who may pose a threat to national and homeland security and to prevent crime and terrorism.
One example of technology intended for risk assessment and threat management is the post-
9/11 program Total Information Awareness (TIA). TIA was the progeny of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the US Department of Defense. TIA can be understood
as a “collect-it-all” data surveillance program. TIA was not explicitly identified as a collect-it-all
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(NSA) slide described the NSA’s procedure as “collect-it-all” (Greenwald 2014b). Collect-it-all
efforts like TIA embody a philosophy that aspires to preventive policing. Mass data collection is
construed as a tool to assess and prevent future threats (Murray 2010). In TIA and other programs
tested or adopted after 9/11, biometric database screening and analysis have emerged as a preferred
method for tracking, identifying, and establishing identity-based inferences in counterterrorism.
This article proceeds in three parts. The first contends that the Cybersurveillance State is
overtaking the National Surveillance State through the capture of big data governance tools and
philosophies that increasingly rely upon biometric surveillance as a form of identification and
precrime risk assessment. The second part provides an overview of biometric identification tech-
nologies. This is intended to clarify the type of technologies discussed in this article. It also explains
why biometric technology is a data backbone for other surveillance systems in governance strate-
gies increasingly motivated by preventive policing. In a post-9/11 policymaking regime, more and
more efforts are focused on preventing crime and terrorism before they occur. Biometric identi-
fication and identity assessments are becoming essential tools for multiple preventive purposes in
criminal, military, and intelligence contexts. The third part addresses how precrime policy ratio-
nales are now informed by biometric-based analysis. In short, biometrics is the means by which
analysis of a citizenry’s data, and any resulting decisions based on that analysis, can be connected
back to a physical person in the real world—whether to approve that person as eligible for a job, as
some employment eligibility database screening systems like E-Verify are, by moving toward bio-
metrics through adopting the E-Verify photo tool (Hu 2013), or to determine whether that person
is eligible to fly on a commercial airline. The No Fly List and digital watchlisting systems are in-
creasingly biometrically centered (Tau 2015). These types of governance assessments, however,
fall within the civil law and administrative law structure. Biometric cybersurveillance systems can
inform targeted killing decisions and other lethal consequences. Often in the service of precrime/
counterterrorism policies, biometric cybersurveillance, therefore, is becoming a linchpin for
broader policymaking and decisionmaking.
From the National Surveillance State to the Cybersurveillance State
Privacy law expert Neil Richards (2013, p. 1936) explains that “[w]e are living in an age of surveil-
lance.” Surveillance has transformed not only public governance but corporate and consumer
governance through the emergence of what business scholar Shoshana Zuboff (2015, p. 75) calls
“surveillance capitalism.” The term surveillance has multiple definitions. The term cybersurveil-
lance, however, has no agreed-upon definition. Law and technology scholar Lawrence Lessig
(2006, p. 209) describes “digital surveillance” as “the process by which some form of human ac-
tivity is analyzed by a computer according to some specified rule . . . . The critical feature in each
[case of surveillance] is that a computer is sorting data for some follow-up review by some human.”
Digital media scholar Mark Andrejevic (2014, p. 56) describes a defining characteristic of “big data
surveillance” as “the imperative . . . to monitor the population as a whole: otherwise it is harder
to consistently and reliably discern useful patterns.” Computer scientist Roger Clarke introduced
the term dataveillance (Clarke 1988, p. 499; Lyon 2007), which he defines as the “systematic use
of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of
one or more persons.” Dataveillance provides a method by which all aspects of a person’s life and
identity may be transformed into digital data ready for analysis. David Lyon (2007, p. 16) clar-
ifies the relationship between dataveillance and surveillance, explaining that “dataveillance also
automates surveillance.”
The normalization of continuous cybersurveillance is integral to the phenomenon of the Na-
tional Surveillance State. Constitutional law scholars Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson explain
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that the National Surveillance State is driven by advances in technology (Balkin 2008, Balkin &
Levinson 2006). It has a preoccupation with automated, transparent identities. It relies upon spe-
cific markers, such as social security and passport numbers, purportedly within a broader context
of authentic governance objectives (Balkin 2008). Other scholars have explored the documents
that constitute identity cards and the surveillance consequences of such documents (Harper 2006,
Lessig 2006, Bennett & Lyon 2008, Lyon 2009, Sobel 2002, Strandburg & Raicu 2006). The Cy-
bersurveillance State is dependent upon emerging developments in the big data cybersurveillance
capacities of both the public and private sectors (Hu 2015c). Scholars have explained that big data
is predictive and correlative (Citron & Pasquale 2014, Pasquale 2016, Richards & King 2013) and
can be seen as a form of artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning (Mayer-Schönberger &
Cukier 2013). Big data depends on a never-ending supply of digital data that informs computer-
generated conclusions (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013).
Though it is described as part of the branch of computer science called artificial intelligence, and more
specifically, an area called machine learning, this characterization is misleading. Big data is not trying
to teach a computer to think like humans. Instead, it is about applying math to huge quantities of data
in order to infer probabilities. (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013, pp. 11–12)
Big data developments transform governance philosophies, such as the adoption of precrime
governance strategies. The Cybersurveillance State is now poised to overtake the National Surveil-
lance State through the capture of big data governance tools and philosophies that increasingly
rely upon biometric identification and precrime assessment tools. A governance philosophy that
relies on isolating and analyzing biometric and biographical data—what privacy scholar Julie
Cohen (2015) refers to as legal constructs under a “biopolitical public domain”—operates un-
der the assumption that big data and biometric technologies have infinite efficiency-enhancing
capacities. The National Surveillance State’s capture of its citizenry’s data trails to regulate and
police the big data state runs parallel with the corporatization of personal data. Big data has trans-
formed both the public and private market into a political and information economy in which an
individual can be reduced to a digital profile made up of data points that can be subjected to surveil-
lance, analysis, and exploitation (boyd & Crawford 2012). Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier (2013,
p. 157) contend that “the new thinking is that people are the sum of [the data].” Their concern is
that
because the government knows whom it will want to scrutinize, it collects, stores, or ensures access
to information not necessarily to monitor everyone at all times, but so that when someone falls under
suspicion, the authorities can immediately investigate rather than having to start gathering the info
from scratch. (Mayer-Schonberger & Cukier 2013, p. 157)
Daniel Solove (2002) describes “digital dossiers,” which aggregate information to assemble a
complete profile of an individual. The combined power of multiple technological innovations that
collect and fuse biographic data and biometrics and track digital footprints can be used to create
digital avatars (Hu 2015c). These avatars are an outgrowth of the Cybersurveillance State’s policies
of radical identity transparency and permit analyses of a population’s data and data connections
among subpopulations for suspicious indicators.
Biometric surveillance is an integral component of the big data age in both governance and
economic developments. Biometric surveillance is integrated into the Internet of Things, for
example, the network in which “objects in your house, car, office, and smartphone communicate,
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(Ferguson 2016, p. 807; Friedland 2015). Under the National Surveillance State, governance in
the big data world means the collection and monitoring of the citizenry’s data trails to facilitate
government benefits and policing. In a world in which daily data trails are increasingly monitored
and collected by public and private watchers, biometric data serve as a means to tie physical and
behavioral data points to other digital data. To do so, biometric data must be digitally captured.
Once in digitized form, biometric data can be aggregated with other biometric databases and
assimilated into biographic databases.
The big data revolution is just beginning. Because datafication is in its infancy, the cyber-
surveillance capacities of big data governance systems, like the No Fly List, are still in nascent
stages. Datafication, like most big data processes, requires increasing amounts of digital data to
support or construct cybersurveillance. It empowers government actions that are based on digital
data collection, data processing protocols, and bulk data analyses (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier
2013). Another way to characterize datafication is as a governmental policy interest that both
transforms analog data (PCAST 2014) into searchable, centralized digital databases and develops
new forms of stored data.
New surveillance methods and varieties of datafication make it possible for the government to
infer a suspect’s status by fusing locational and biographical-behavioral surveillance. This process
facilitates identity verification and data management protocols that permit tracking and analytics
for a variety of tasks, including identifying potential suspects or inferring terroristic characteristics.
The 2014 White House Report to the President from the President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology (PCAST 2014), titled Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective, is
useful for understanding the fusion process that is made possible through big data. The PCAST
report described the private sector consumer fusion processes in the following manner:
Data fusion occurs when data from different sources are brought into contact and new facts emerge.
Individually, each data source may have a specific, limited purpose. Their combination, however, may
uncover new meanings. In particular, data fusion can result in the identification of individual people,
the creation of profiles of an individual, and the tracking of an individual’s activities. More broadly,
data analytics discovers patterns and correlations in large corpuses of data, using increasingly powerful
statistical algorithms. If those data include personal data, the inferences flowing from data analytics
may then be mapped back to inferences, both certain and uncertain, about individuals. (PCAST 2014,
p. x)
Surveillance of an individual’s body can be fused with biographical surveillance through big
data tools. The process of biometric datafication refers to transforming an individual’s physical
and behavioral characteristics into data (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013). Datafication of an
individual’s body in a big data governance system occurs first through the capture of geolocational
and biometric data. Next, the data is aggregated, stored, and analyzed.
The 2014 White House PCAST (2014) report recognizes the potential role of fusion in gov-
ernment data analytics. Fusion can predict an individual’s perceived threat level in criminal and
terrorism investigations. Programs such as Social Radar, for example, can use fusion to iden-
tify perceived threats from social and political movements, including classifications of individuals
and what has been referred to as “social contagions” (Ahmed 2014). Former Chief Scientist of
the US Air Force Mark Maybury is publicly attributed as the primary architect of Social Radar
(Shachtman 2012). An AI and language processing specialist, Maybury has explained that the US
Department of Defense is currently attempting to construct “a virtual sensor, combining a vast
array of technologies and disciplines . . . [as] part of a broader Pentagon effort to master the societal
and cultural elements of war” (Shachtman 2012). In other words, “using biometrics, Social Radar
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Figure 1
Social Radar (project of the US Department of Defense, US Air Force). Figure copyright c© 2010 from
Maybury M. 2010. Cross-cultural decision making. In Social Radar for Smart Power, ed. D Schmorrow &
D Nicholson. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Reproduced by permission of Taylor and Francis Group, LLC, a
division of Informa plc.
will identify individuals . . . . Using sociometrics, it will pinpoint groups. [Sociometric datapoints
include] Facebook timelines, political polls, [and] spy drone feeds” (Shachtman 2012). As of 2012,
the Pentagon had invested over $125 million to “quantify, model—and, eventually, foresee—the
human, social, cultural, and behavioral dimensions of conflict” (Shachtman 2012).
Figure 1 provides a pictorial depiction of the comprehensive cybersurveillance anticipated
through the Social Radar system, which anticipated the full integration of drone footage, biomet-
ric data signatures, econometrics, and other intelligence sources to achieve higher-order cyber-
surveillance inferences.
Social Radar appears to trace its philosophical origins to TIA. The development of TIA after the
9/11 terrorist attacks was guided under the leadership of the newly created Information Awareness
Office within DARPA (Harris 2012, Murray 2010). Within this office, TIA was an effort led by
retired Navy Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter (Murray 2010), who served as a national security
advisor to President Reagan (Harris 2012). TIA was informed by a philosophy of “predictive
policing,” which “focuses not on collecting evidence about actual wrongdoing but on the broad
collection of information about everyday activities with the intention of detecting (and preventing)
future behavior” (Murray 2010, p. 5). Congress officially defunded TIA in late 2003 (Murray
2010, Slobogin 2008, USA Today 2003). Experts have nonetheless noted that remnants of the TIA
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Figure 2
Total Information Awareness (TIA) (former project of the US Department of Defense, DARPA)
(TruthMove 2016).
experts had explored the possibility that the NSA had constructed a global surveillance apparatus
that shared TIA’s goals (Harris 2012, Murray 2010, Slobogin 2008). Specifically, in an interview,
computer scientist David J. Farber, often referred to as the Grandfather of the Internet, opined
that TIA had carried on within the NSA and that evidence of TIA’s quiet existence is visible in
the types of programs disclosed by Edward Snowden (Horgan 2013). Over the past decade, there
has been growing interest in surveillance systems (Slobogin 2014). This attention has revealed
various programs that appear to duplicate TIA’s ambitions of using bulk data and digital dossiers
to prevent future acts of crime and terrorism. Other programs have the goal of predicting “social
contagions” by collecting and analyzing social media and internet activity (Ahmed 2014).
Poindexter (2002) has explained that TIA was designed to “detect, classify, identify, and track
terrorists so that we may understand their plans and act to prevent them from being executed.” The
collect-it-all cybersurveillance effort was aimed beyond the intelligence community; as Poindexter
(2002) stated, “in the case of counter-terrorism, it is broader to include law enforcement, friendly
allies, outside experts, etc.” Figure 2 provides a graphic depiction of how TIA was intended to
operate.
As Figures 1 and 2 show, biometric data appear to be a data backbone that provides a source
for the evolution of multiple identity screening systems. This biometric backbone is analogous to
the manner in which social security and passport number systems form a numerical data backbone
for database screening. The cybersurveillance sweep of the data of entire populations and subpop-
ulations requires a method to isolate individuals within that population or subpopulation for more
isolated targeting and further investigation. Biometric data can serve this purpose, as demonstrated
by the portion of TIA’s Figure 2 referencing “authentication [of ] biometric data.” Authentica-
tion of biometric data—specifically face, fingerprint, gait, and iris scans—suggests that identity
verification and identity determination can be executed through biometric database screening.
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One of the biometric data programs under TIA, for instance, referred to a component known as
“Human Identification at a Distance,” meant to “achieve positive identification of humans using
multimodal biometric technologies” (Poindexter 2002). The manner in which multimodal bio-
metric data—a combination of biometric identifiers, such as facial recognition technology and iris
and fingerprint scanning—can serve predictive policing purposes by anchoring one’s identity is
demonstrated by TIA’s reference to “authentication [of ] biometric data” in a DARPA infographic
slide (TruthMove 2016). Authentication of biometric data—with the TIA slide specifically list-
ing examples of biometric identifiers such as face, fingerprint, gait, and iris scans—suggests that
identity verification and determination can be executed through biometric database screening.
TIA, Social Radar, and other collect-it-all programs with precrime governing ambitions are
able to maximize technological capacities in a way that can permit the cybersurveillance monitor-
ing of entire populations to pinpoint suspicious data profiles. This monitoring can take the form
of digital watchlisting and database screening systems that isolate data, devices, or persons deemed
suspicious, for instance, or other data tracking or data surveillance methods. The Snowden dis-
closures and other media reports appear to confirm that suspicious data, rather than suspicious
persons, are targeted (Scahill & Greenwald 2014). For example, a former drone operator for the
US military’s Joint Special Operations Command explained that NSA drone strike targets are
often identified through metadata analysis and cell phone tracking. He explained, “It’s really like
we’re targeting a cell phone. We’re not going after people—we’re going after their phones in
hopes that the person on the other end is a bad guy” (Scahill & Greenwald 2014). For strikes
seeking greater precision, once a data profile is isolated and deemed suspicious, biometric data
may serve as a means to isolate the individual associated with that profile, such as voice recognition
(Poitras et al. 2014).
As a result, the Cybersurveillance State, as a technological successor to the National Surveillance
State, will execute bureaucratized biometric cybersurveillance in ways that are largely invisible and
that appear routinized when technologically embedded within biometric identification technolo-
gies harnessed by the Administrative State. The normalization of day-to-day cybersurveillance will
be achieved largely through governing functions that appear purely administrative (e.g., identity
assessments for the granting of welfare, rights, privileges, and governing incentives). Because of
the routinized and administrative nature of the government-led big data program or data surveil-
lance (dataveillance) program, contemporary cybersurveillance is likely to be viewed as justified
under crime, immigration control, and counterterrorism policy rationales.
Overview of Biometric Identification and Verification Technology
Currently, biometric verification and identification technologies are not commonly perceived to be
surveillance technologies—the public and private sectors typically treat them as a benign and use-
ful form of digitized identification. Such automated biometric screening is considered to be a more
efficient form of small data verification technologies, such as human screening or human-driven
practices involving assessments of biometric or forensic data. Small data biometric verification
could include comparing a passport photo against the person holding the passport. Big data bio-
metric identification, however, has a distinct impact from that of small data biometric investigation
because it can facilitate surveillance. Big data photo screening may entail the collection of digital
photographs. This in turn can lead to facilitating facial recognition technology through the mass
digitization of photo databases, potentially including billions of facial images. One Snowden dis-
closure noted that the NSA collects millions of digital photographs from internet and social media
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data identification systems rely on algorithmic, database-driven facial recognition technology that
enhances the capacity for mass surveillance capacities in ways that are difficult to understand.
The potential for mass surveillance is part of the problematic nature of biometric credentialing
and identification practices. Like most digital data, biometric identification data are not restricted
to the purpose for which they were originally collected. Biometric data can be repurposed for
secondary uses, such as identification of potential suspects or victims through real-time analytics,
assessment of threats of terrorism, tactical decisionmaking, or behavioral and genetic research
(Duster 2003). Beyond secondary—and tertiary, quaternary, and quinary—uses, biometric data
become a part of population-wide risk assessments that incorporate bureaucratized surveillance
into governing decisions, policing, and threat assessments. Through big data tools, precrime
governance models are increasingly reflected in collect-it-all cybersurveillance systems. In these
systems, biometric data is a surveillance axis that can be used to track, identify, and isolate suspicious
persons, digital data, or devices (Hu 2015a).
As a result of big data biometric governance trends, meaningful distinctions between bio-
metric credentialing for identification and behavioral biometric profiling are disappearing. The
objectives are merging: Reliable credentialing is used to advance security and precrime policy
rationales. Biometric data mission creep occurs by necessity in a big data world because the cy-
bersurveillance systems are often designed to engage in mass data integration and analysis and
predictive policing. Biometric surveillance serves two purposes in preventive policing: It increases
identity transparency, and the biometric data categorize identity through cataloging behavioral
and physical characteristics and assess these characteristics for risk.
Contrasting small data biometric credentialing protocols with big data credentialing protocols
is useful. It illustrates how biometric surveillance fits within the Cybersurveillance State. In a
small data world, paper-based passports and nondigitized photographs are examples of a small data
biometric-based identification system. In a big data world, a digitized passport system can link to
multiple other sources, such as license plate readers, No Fly Lists, and Terrorist Watchlists. Facial
recognition technology drawing upon a photo database could potentially link a plethora of digital
images of a person, including social media, the internet, photo databases like driver’s licenses,
live-streaming video, CCTV surveillance, and images obtained from hacking cameras on laptops
and digital devices. Biometric data collection and storage are becoming increasingly compulsory
through either government identification requirements, such as digital photo requirements for
passports and driver’s licenses, or corporate identification requirements, such as biometric access
to digital devices.
Because of technological developments and trends in governance, it is challenging, if not impos-
sible, to prevent biometric data capture and collection. Biometric surveillance systems increasingly
require opting in as the price of social, economic, and political participation. Biometric data cap-
ture is difficult to resist because it is simultaneously compulsory and transparent. Biometric data
collection is often compulsory because it is increasingly mandatory to establish identity. Biomet-
rics are transparent qualities because it is very difficult to hide biometrics; an individual’s face, iris,
or fingerprint can be digitally captured in any public place. Because biometric data support larger
big data programs, such as No Fly List–type risk assessments, it is extraordinarily difficult, if not
impossible, to opt out (Hu 2017a).
Biometrics is “[t]he science of automatic identification or identity verification of individuals
using [unique] physiological or behavioral characteristics” (Vacca 2007, p. 589). Biometric-based
identification can involve collection and analysis of hard or primary biometrics (Vacca 2007):
traditional biometric data identifiers that support automated identity verification technologies.
Examples include scanned fingerprints, facial recognition technology, iris scans, and DNA database
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screening. Automated biometric data systems serve “secure identification and personal verification
solutions” (Vacca 2007, p. 57).
Biometric-based identification or identity verification systems may also collect and analyze
“soft biometrics,” or secondary biometrics (Niinuma et al. 2010). Soft biometrics are distinguished
from hard biometrics based on their perceived reliability in automated identification characteris-
tics. Soft, or secondary, biometrics is defined as an “anatomical or behavioral characteristic that
provides some information about the identity of a person, but does not provide sufficient evidence
to precisely determine the identity” (Li & Jain 2009, p. 1235). Examples of soft or secondary bio-
metric identification systems include digital analysis or automated determination of age, height,
weight, race, ethnicity, hair and skin color, scars and birthmarks, and tattoos (Li & Jain 2009).
Behavioral biometric data are defined as “traits that are learned or acquired” (Vacca 2007, p. 3).
Biometric behavioral identifiers include a range of traits such as keystroke patterns and mouse-use
characteristics; analysis of gait and signature; voice identification; and cognitive biometrics, such
as neural responses. Other biometric identifiers might include skeletal bone scans, brain scans,
body odor, eyebrow shape, and ear shape. Some biometric data may be combined with verifying
data to infer information about an individual. This other biometric data could include heart rate,
perspiration, sweat pore analysis, and eye pupil dilation.
Digitized biometric identification and biometric database screening technology aims to remove
human decisionmaking from the matching process. Instead, matching is done by an automated or
semiautomated system. Biometric technology is increasingly considered by the political branches
to be an efficacious policy prescription for complex homeland security, national security, immi-
gration control, and intelligence or military matters (Hu 2017a). The political branches perceive
biometric data as the gold standard of identity management systems: It is presented as scientifi-
cally objective and purportedly forgery proof through algorithmic analysis (Garfinkel 2000, Gates
2011, Hu 2013, Lynch 2012, Magnet 2011). A similar algorithmic identity management system,
E-Verify, now operates to verify identity before authorizing the right to work. Although E-Verify
does not currently require a biometric identification component, it has been discussed in Congress
(Hu 2013, Ries 2010). It affects the right to drive: The Real ID Act of 2005 [Pub. L. No. 109–13,
119 Stat. 302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. 2012)] includes technological
enhancements and requires digital photos that can be analyzed with facial recognition software.
It also potentially affects the right to vote [42 U.S.C. § 15483(a) (2012); US Gov. Account. Off.
2010]. These verifications are purportedly to more effectively secure the border and screen out po-
tential terrorist threats, criminal aliens, or unlawfully present immigrants. Many of these identity
management systems are moving toward biometric data as a method for identity verification.
Once biometric data have been collected, to make identity screening feasible, the data must be
compiled within a database. Using biometric data for identity verification and authentication sup-
ports Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) domestic identity management goals (Cyber
Sec. Res. Dev. 2016, Thomson 2007) and the Department of Defense’s international popula-
tion management goals (Public Intelligence 2014). DHS defines identity management as including
administrative processes that serve “authentication and authorization” goals through managing
technological, facilities, and digital data access (Cyber Sec. Res. Dev. 2016). Identity management
mediates “user rights, entitlements, and privileges with the established identity” (Cyber Sec. Res.
Dev. 2016).
The US military used the term population management in relation to international security to
describe a broad category of goals considered essential to achieving strategic military objectives.
For example, the term population management serves to operationalize and explicate the justifi-
cation for the data collection of the biometrics and “contextual data” of “every living person in
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Acquisition of biometric surveillance technologies and biometric databases is a common gov-
ernment practice to facilitate governance goals. Day-to-day uses include criminal and count-
erterrorism purposes: counterterrorism, military, or intelligence identification, homeland secu-
rity, border security, immigration control, and criminal identification or surveillance. Tools in
these programs include fingerprint and facial recognition technology using database screening,
prison visitor systems, and parole monitoring. Other biometric surveillance technologies may be
used in civil identification, such as drivers’ license or voting systems or benefit-payment systems,
for example, biometric identification as a condition for obtaining welfare benefits. Biometrics can
also be deployed to restrict access to physical locations (physical access) and technological access
(logical access). Logical access restrictions may include measures such as requiring biometric IDs
before accessing computer and electronic devices and internet services. Such restrictions expand
data collection and analysis capacities and provide more accurate digital avatars that in turn support
the Cybersurveillance State’s mission of complete identity transparency (Hu 2013).
In other words, government-led biometric surveillance is often for the purpose of identifi-
cation and identity-based assessments: verification of identity (Is this person who they claim to
be?), determination of identity (Who is this person?), and identity-based assessments (Does this
person have a criminal or terroristic disposition?). The process of biometric identification may,
but does not necessarily, involve traditional surveillance activities, such as domestic or foreign in-
telligence gathering. Advances in biometric surveillance represent a new era of cybersurveillance.
Under cybersurveillance technologies, governing emphasis is placed on big data–driven protocols:
mass data collection and aggregation, data mining and database screening, digital watchlisting,
algorithmic intelligence, and risk assessment and predictive analysis.
Biometric surveillance can involve the following types of activities in combination or standing
alone: capturing, storing, and tracking biometric data; aggregating, databasing, and sharing bio-
metrics; and analyzing biometric identifiers (Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 14). Biometric surveillance as a form of bureaucratized surveillance is not new. For exam-
ple, the compilation of photographs by police into record books to help identify suspects, files
consisting of passport photographs compiled for the purposes of identification, and even the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation’s national fingerprint and DNA databases are established forms of
biometric surveillance.
However, biometric cybersurveillance is new, as are big data system–dependent forms of gover-
nance (Wittes & Blum 2015). Examples of bureaucratized biometric cybersurveillance may include
digitized, biometric-based social security cards or passports. A 2010 immigration reform proposal
from senators Schumer & Graham (2010) recommended adopting a high-tech social security card
that can be swiped like a credit card. This digitized biometric card could replace the numeric,
paper-based social security card (Schumer & Graham 2010). Biometric databases assembled to
implement such a card could then enable surveillance to identify individuals and aggregate data,
such as where and when the credentials were presented.
Adoption of new technologies such as these will only expand trends in biometric surveillance
and big data governance. As discussed below, adopting biometric-based identification systems
will likely lead to long-term surveillance consequences. Digitized and machine-readable identi-
fication documents that can collect and aggregate data in databases risk feeding comprehensive
and interrelated cybersurveillance systems (e.g., Total Information Management and collect-it-all
systems).
The merger of biometric surveillance with big data tools—what can be described as biometric
cybersurveillance or biometric identification cybersurveillance—can dramatically expand the cy-
bersurveillance capacities of governments. A government-administered identification system has
the capacity to make its biometric data collection protocols compulsory, or near-compulsory, by
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conditioning government privileges and benefits on compliance with biometric data collection.
For example, a digitized biometric-based identification system—such as a biometric database
screening system to establish identity for employment, voting, flying, or driving—could enable
the development of a near-universal biometric database.
Such a centralized database could have multiple functions, including identity verification and
identity tracking. This database would potentially contain a wealth of uniquely identifying infor-
mation on a heretofore unknown scale. Further, the data could be combined or exchanged with
other databases. Possible analyses through cross-referencing would be infinitely enlarged. The
potential inferences of suspicion that could be drawn in identity assessments would be infinitely
augmented. As stated above, big data is predictive; thus, these identity-based bureaucratic systems
could serve precrime goals.
Biometric verification technologies are commonly used in the private sector as well, particularly
for restricting technological access, such as fingerprint readers on smartphones; facial recognition
technology for laptops; or logical access restrictions, which limit an individual’s ability to access
technology, the internet, telecommunications, or ATMs (Hu 2013). Biometric verification may
restrict or grant physical access, such as biometric-enhanced security measures at Walt Disney.
Some employers have begun inserting microchips into employees’ bodies that can unlock doors,
operate electronic equipment, or make purchases (Assoc. Press 2017). Private sector biometric data
is increasingly available to governments, as demonstrated by law enforcement access to private
DNA databases used for familial and genetic historical information (Koerner 2015).
The ability to combine biometric databases with public and private databases makes precrime
and preterrorism objectives appear more plausible in the eyes of policymakers. Precrime governing
ambitions that once could only be imagined in science fiction are now perceived as within the realm
of possibility with the aid of biometric-based identity management systems and other compre-
hensive cybersurveillance systems that try to combine 24/7 body tracking with 360◦ biographical
tracking. Predictive policing relies on big data tools and algorithms, methods of analyzing mass
data collection to assess future risk. Although multiple experts challenge the validity of precrime
programs (Ferguson 2015, Furnas 2012, Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013, O’Neill 2016) and
explore the limits of biometric surveillance (Garfinkel 2000, Gates 2011, Lynch 2012, Magnet
2011), precrime policy rationales are increasingly behind the drive to adopt biometric surveillance
technologies and other cybersurveillance systems.
Biometric data surveillance thus differs from other types of data surveillance. Biometric data are
privileged in the development of cybersurveillance regimes. This is because biometric data anchor
identity-based data points for the purpose of connecting identity data to other data points. This
process can also serve as a means of enabling bureaucratized and automated or semiautomated
decisionmaking. Thus, collection and analysis of biometric data are involved in a multitude of
public and private services. These include, for example, border security, including biometric data
harvesting and analysis at points of entry; cybersecurity safeguards, including password protection
and user identification (Apple Inc. 2016, Schneier 2016); and attempts to discover possible motives
or threat-related behaviors in risk assessment protocols.
The use of biometric data for security purposes is alluring because, as the data come from an in-
dividual’s body, it is often considered forgery resistant (Yakowicz 2016). Digitized biometric data
provide a unique technological identifier that is obtained from an individualized characteristic of a
person’s body (Pato & Millett 2010). Biometric data can be pulled, for example, from digital pho-
tographs and voice recordings that are then processed by facial and voice recognition technologies
(Pato & Millett 2010, Vacca 2007). Law enforcement and other government agencies consider
biometric-based surveillance technologies effective because they can be multipurpose surveillance
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license plate readers (Shockley 2014). Other emerging biometric surveillance technologies, de-
scribed as situational awareness surveillance systems, are sensor-network oriented. These systems
can integrate biometric surveillance, such as facial recognition, with live-streaming video, real-time
social media, and other surveillance screenings (Faraone et al. 2014, Garvie et al. 2016). Because
biometric identification technologies can integrate into social media and internet screening, gov-
ernmental precrime and preterrorism ambitions are increasingly linked to biometric surveillance
capacities.
The popular assumption is that biometric identification credentialing is among the most secure,
reliable, and technologically advanced. Although biometric data are understood to set the gold
standard for identification systems (Gomez 2013), such identity tools are not without their flaws:
They have proven vulnerable to hacks and may be less secure than traditional password protection
(Murgia 2016). Thus, arguments challenging the infallibility of biometric identification sound
counterintuitive. Biometric data’s reputation as the gold-standard identification method originated
in a small data world. In that world, biometric data verification was combined with human judgment
and perception and forensic science applications (Hu 2015c).
Yet, in a big data world, biometric data are increasingly vulnerable and carry greater potential
for fraud and abuse. It is the digitization of biometric credentialing and screening that makes it
more vulnerable. In a big data world, algorithms and supercomputing tools are considered superior
to small data forensics or human judgment and perception. Thus, digitized forms of exploitation
can weaken the security and reliability of big data biometric credentialing because it is possible
to manipulate these tools or the underlying biometrics. Digitized images and internet data trails
permit biometric data to be hacked, rigged, spoofed, stolen, and duplicated (Fox-Brewster 2015,
Hern 2014, Hu 2017a).
Biometric password protection for digital devices such as smartphones is often presented as
tamper resistant. Researchers, however, have revealed vulnerabilities in biometric identification
methods. Computer scientists have been able to spoof mobile fingerprint readers to unlock finger-
print recognition systems (Cao & Jain 2016). In one instance, local law enforcement sought the
expertise of these scientists to gain access to a homicide victim’s fingerprint password–protected
smartphone. Law enforcement provided the scientists with the victim’s fingerprints, which the
scientists used to produce enhanced 2D fingerprints that could unlock the phone ( Jesse 2016).
Facial recognition technology and retinal recognition, often presented as necessary for identity
security, are similarly vulnerable. Security and computer vision specialists in one study were able
to create a digital 3D facial model using publicly available photos that deceived four out of five
authentication systems (Newman 2016). In another study, a research team relied upon iris codes
in security databases to recreate synthetic irises that, according to the researchers, successfully
passed recognition tests 80% of the time (BBC News 2012).
Precrime Policy Under Biometric Surveillance and Big Data Governance
In the previous sections, the discussion focused on the aggregation of biometric data and other data.
In a big data world this aggregated data can be filtered through multiple systems: databases, screen-
ing, digital watchlisting, and other dataveillance and cybersurveillance programs. Data screening
technologies can pinpoint sources of suspicion, and biometric technologies can then identify spe-
cific individuals linked to the digital avatar or technological surrogate, such as a smartphone,
that is the target. This section focuses on the administrative and bureaucratized nature of bio-
metric surveillance technologies that can inform governmental actions that potentially can range
from “being temporarily detained to deportation, prison, or death” (Dep. Homel. Secur. 2008,
p. 2).
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The recent Snowden disclosures of NSA cybersurveillance programs and other media reports
appear to indicate that biometric data (Risen & Poitras 2014), if and when it is fully integrated into
other dataveillance systems, may inform targeted killing technologies (Gellman & Soltani 2013,
Miller et al. 2013, Scahill & Greenwald 2014). The Snowden disclosures revealed that drone
strikes “rel[y] heavily on the NSA’s ability to vacuum up enormous quantities of email, phone
calls and other fragments” (Miller et al. 2013). Information provided in the Snowden disclosures
suggested that harvesting and fusion of biometric and biographic data from digitized sources,
including social media and the internet, were likely used for intelligence purposes. From one
of the Snowden documents, the NSA states one goal as to “‘compile biographic and biometric
information’ that can help ‘implement precision targeting’” (Risen & Poitras 2014). “Targeting,”
although not defined in this particular Snowden disclosure, is a specific term of art. It can frequently
refer to targeted killing measures and drone strikes (US Dep. Def. 2011).
Prior to the Snowden disclosures, media reports suggested that the US military is awarding
contracts to defense contractors tasked with developing the integration of biometric data into
targeting technologies (Shachtman 2011). These technologies are intended to be both analytic
and predictive. For example, the Adversary Behavior Acquisition, Collection, Understanding and
Summarization (ABACUS) tool would “integrate data from informants’ tips, drone footage and
captured calls” to “apply ‘a human behavior modeling and simulation engine’” (Shachtman 2011).
Many of these systems are driven by databases. For example, a database referred to as the disposition
matrix that was developed under the Obama administration “is designed to go beyond existing kill
lists, mapping plans for the ‘disposition’ of suspects beyond the reach of American drones” (Miller
2012). These emerging big data cybersurveillance systems integrate mass biometric dataveillance
technologies into other intelligence data to identify potential terrorists or other security threats.
Other Snowden disclosures appeared to reaffirm the value of biometric surveillance to the in-
telligence community as a tool that could inform “precision targeting” decisionmaking, including,
for example, attempting to increase the accuracy of intelligence to inform drone strikes (Risen
& Poitras 2014). The intelligence community is increasingly reliant upon biometrics to iden-
tify targets and suspicious behavior through the analysis of unique physiological and behavioral
characteristics. For example, one 2010 NSA document explains, “It’s not just the traditional com-
munications we’re after: It’s taking a full-arsenal approach that digitally exploits the clues a target
leaves behind in their regular activities on the net to compile biographic and biometric information
that can help implement precision targeting” (Risen & Poitras 2014).
Yet it is important to note that many biometric surveillance technologies and cybersurveillance
systems—along with the data they capture and the findings they produce—are highly experimental.
There is a risk that technologies might be rolled out prematurely and that biometric identification
will be abused through mission creep: Identity verification programs pose a threat of drifting into
TIA-type mass surveillance systems that may inform a broad range of predictive inferences (Hu
2017a). The routinization and bureaucratization of cybersurveillance through daily governance
functions ensure the invisibility of this mission creep, especially the migration of military surveil-
lance and foreign intelligence technologies to domestic use and daily law enforcement (Balkin
2008, Hu 2017b). These cybersurveillance technologies algorithmically fuse data to assess risks
and threats. A military contractor explained that one biometric fusion program, Clear Heart,
although intended for US military use, was adaptable to domestic use, including “‘domestic se-
curity, border protection and state and local law enforcement . . . . envision[ing] a host of uses for
this anywhere there is a need for crowd control, antidrug, anticrime and border control’” (Modus
Operandi 2012).
This mission creep is facilitated by fully transparent identities made possible by universal bio-
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explain how, in the Cybersurveillance State, biometric data operate as a foundational surveillance
anchor point. Biometric data analysis in national security contexts is becoming ubiquitous. “While
once focused on written and oral communications, the NSA now considers facial images, finger-
prints and other identifiers just as important to its mission of tracking suspected terrorists and
other intelligence targets, the documents show” (Risen & Poitras 2014). NSA documents disclosed
by Snowden explain that the agency intercepted millions of digital images daily, including “about
55,000 ‘facial recognition quality images’” (Risen & Poitras 2014). It was also revealed that facial
recognition technology was applied to digital photographs obtained from the internet and used to
identify an individual. This biometric identification was screened against “two dozen data points”
that included the “Transportation Security Administration no-fly list, [the individual’s] passport
and visa status, known associates or suspected terrorist ties, and comments made about him by
informants to American intelligence agencies” (Risen & Poitras 2014).
Biometric surveillance is increasingly common in domestic contexts. A 2016 report by the
Georgetown Law Center on Privacy and Technology noted that law enforcement facial recog-
nition networks include over 117 million American adults, and at least 26 states permit law en-
forcement to search against drivers’ license photos (Garvie et al. 2016, p. 2). In a small data world,
intelligence and law enforcement collected and analyzed small data—written and oral communi-
cations. In a big data world, biometric data collection serves to identify and anchor data points
around the individual to allow inferences of suspicion. The National Surveillance State, and now
the emerging Cybersurveillance State, incentivizes a merger between foreign and domestic bio-
metric intelligence gathering and corporate biometric surveillance (Hu 2017b, Strahilevitz 2012).
Increasingly, the data collected by the National Surveillance State is used for cybersurveillance
purposes. The Cybersurveillance State intentionally and inadvertently captures data that is a
byproduct of datafication (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013). Inferences of suspicion in the
Cybersurveillance State rely on both primary and incidental data (e.g., secondary and tertiary
data).
The National Surveillance State poses problems that existing legal structures do not anticipate
and may be unable to resolve (Balkin & Levinson 2006). Balkin (2008, pp. 15–16) explains that
in the National Surveillance State, the danger is that “government will create a parallel track of
preventative law enforcement that routes around the traditional guarantees of the Bill of Rights,”
and that “traditional law enforcement and social services will increasingly resemble that parallel
track.” In the Cybersurveillance State, individuals will be increasingly unable to identify the ratio-
nales behind being digitally blacklisted and unable to challenge the consequences of presumption
of data-derived guilt (Citron & Pasquale 2014, Hu 2015a, Pasquale 2016). Balkin & Levinson
(2006) have explained that the procedural protections set forth by the Constitution are insufficient
in the National Surveillance State. Laura Donahue (2012) and other experts have concluded that
neither surveillance law nor privacy statutes, nor the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, are sufficient. As a consequence, further legal protection is necessary in the face
of new types of surveillance harms stemming from emerging biometric data identification and
tracking technologies.
Although the government embraces mass biometric-based identification systems, there has
not been a sufficient analysis of due process protections for individuals subjected to biometric
identification systems (Pato & Millett 2010). An individual wrongly identified through one of
these systems may not be able to interrogate the chain of evidence relied upon or contest the
databases or algorithms that have reached the erroneous conclusion (Kaye 2013, Mnookin 2010,
Murphy 2013, Roth 2010). Nor is there a federal regulatory body that establishes and supervises
standards for biometric data and technology. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) is tasked with testing oversight of federal biometric technologies, but NIST does not set
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minimally proficient standards (US Gen. Account. Off. 2002). As a result, the Cybersurveillance
State grows unchecked: The more data is collected, the more data is analyzed, the more data
is generated from the analysis, and the more data is required. Because of a greater emphasis on
identity transparency and identity management, the National Surveillance State is becoming a
Biometric Cybersurveillance State.
CONCLUSION
The Cybersurveillance State, like the National Surveillance State, normalizes surveillance through
the Administrative State. In contrast to the National Surveillance State, however, it will
emphasize the need to govern data selves and manage threat risks attached to digital avatars rather
than the need to govern individuals. To manage data, evaluate threats, and mediate rights and
privileges, the Cybersurveillance State will increasingly rely upon the aggregation of data-driven
systems for population management through tools such as bulk metadata collection and mass
data tracking; digitized identity management programs; algorithm-driven risk-based assessments;
and digital watchlisting and database screening, such as the Terrorist Watchlist and No Fly List.
Consequently, biometric data will be privileged as a superior data point as the Cybersurveillance
State relies on transparency of identity and identity management policy rationales. Biometric
identification technologies, when combined with other biographic data collection and data fusion,
facilitate the construction of digital avatars that ultimately merge the digital and physical selves.
This process permits targeting potential criminal and terrorist suspects’ data deemed suspect.
In a big data world, under the Cybersurveillance State, analyses of population-wide digital
data—algorithmic analysis of bulk metadata, tracking of an absence of digital data, monitoring of
web activity and social media presence, or behaviors linked to technological surrogates such as
a smartphone—may be sufficient indicia of suspicion and guilt. Because of its breadth and rapid
growth of data collection practices, and the precrime inferences from database screening and
other data analytic protocols, the Cybersurveillance State poses harms that are unanticipated by our
current legal system. Therefore, potential constitutional violations stemming from bureaucratized
biometric cybersurveillance systems will be increasingly difficult to see and to challenge.
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